Fear and Loathing in Times of Distress – Causal Impact of Social and Economic Insecurity on Anti-Immigration Sentiment

55 Pages Posted: 16 Dec 2020

See all articles by Gianmarco Daniele

Gianmarco Daniele

Vrije Universiteit Brussel (VUB) - Faculty of Economic, Social and Political Sciences

Andrea FM Martinangeli

Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance

Francesco Passarelli

Harvard University

Willem Sas

University of Stirling - Department of Economics; KU Leuven - Department of Economics

Lisa Windsteiger

Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance

Date Written: December 16, 2020

Abstract

The causal nexus between socio-economic stressors and anti-immigration sentiments remains unclear despite increasing evidence over their correlation. We exploit the social and economic disruptions brought about by the epidemic outbreak in March 2020 to randomly provide survey respondents with, at the time of the survey, pessimistic information about the economic and health consequences of the epidemic. Both economic and social stressors causally induce upsurges in anti-immigration sentiment and demand for fiscal pressure retrenchment. However, radicalised attitudes are accompanied by political radicalisation only when the negative economic consequences of the epidemic are highlighted.

Keywords: D72, H51, H53, H55, O52, P52

JEL Classification: economic crisis, social crisis, immigration, survey experiment, radical political preferences

Suggested Citation

Daniele, Gianmarco and Martinangeli, Andrea and Passarelli, Francesco and Sas, Willem and Windsteiger, Lisa, Fear and Loathing in Times of Distress – Causal Impact of Social and Economic Insecurity on Anti-Immigration Sentiment (December 16, 2020). Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance No. 2020-17, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3750161 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3750161

Gianmarco Daniele

Vrije Universiteit Brussel (VUB) - Faculty of Economic, Social and Political Sciences ( email )

Ave. Franklin D Roosevelt, 50 - C.P. 191
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium

Andrea Martinangeli (Contact Author)

Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance ( email )

Marstallplatz 1
Munich, 80539
Germany

Francesco Passarelli

Harvard University

1875 Cambridge Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Willem Sas

University of Stirling - Department of Economics ( email )

Stirling, FK9 4LA
United Kingdom

KU Leuven - Department of Economics ( email )

Leuven, B-3000
Belgium

Lisa Windsteiger

Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance ( email )

Marstallplatz 1
Munich, 80539
Germany

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