The Causal Impact of Pandemic Distress on Anti-Immigration Sentiments

70 Pages Posted: 16 Dec 2020 Last revised: 7 Feb 2022

See all articles by Gianmarco Daniele

Gianmarco Daniele

University of Milan - Faculty of Law; Bocconi University

Andrea FM Martinangeli

Burgundy School of Business; University of Gothenburg - Centre for Collective Action (CeCAR)

Francesco Passarelli

Harvard University

Willem Sas

University of Stirling - Department of Economics; KU Leuven - Department of Economics

Lisa Windsteiger

Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance

Date Written: December 16, 2020

Abstract

We investigate the causal nexus between pandemic distress and anti-immigration sentiments. We exploit the disruption brought about by the Covid-19 outbreak to randomly provide survey respondents with information on both the economic and health consequences of the pandemic. Overall, we find that pessimistic information causally reinforces the wish to exclude immigrants from access to health care. Further, a pessimistic economic outlook reinforces overall adversity to immigration as well as political radicalisation. Both effects are less pronounced in areas with larger immigrant populations. Our theoretical model pins down two possible mechanisms explaining these results: a zero-sum game to split scarce public resources between residents and immigrants on the one hand and, on the other, fear of contagion.

Keywords: D72, H51, H53, H55, O52, P52

JEL Classification: economic crisis, social crisis, immigration, survey experiment, radical political preferences

Suggested Citation

Daniele, Gianmarco and Martinangeli, Andrea and Passarelli, Francesco and Sas, Willem and Windsteiger, Lisa, The Causal Impact of Pandemic Distress on Anti-Immigration Sentiments (December 16, 2020). Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance No. 2020-17, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3750161 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3750161

Gianmarco Daniele

University of Milan - Faculty of Law ( email )

Via Festa del Perdono, 7
20122 Milano
Italy

Bocconi University ( email )

Via Sarfatti 25
Milan, MI 20136
Italy

Andrea Martinangeli (Contact Author)

Burgundy School of Business ( email )

29 Rue Sambin
Dijon, 21000
France

University of Gothenburg - Centre for Collective Action (CeCAR) ( email )

Box 100, S-405 30
Gothenburg
Sweden

Francesco Passarelli

Harvard University

1875 Cambridge Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Willem Sas

University of Stirling - Department of Economics ( email )

Stirling, FK9 4LA
United Kingdom

KU Leuven - Department of Economics ( email )

Leuven, B-3000
Belgium

Lisa Windsteiger

Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance ( email )

Marstallplatz 1
Munich, 80539
Germany

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
75
Abstract Views
459
rank
420,961
PlumX Metrics