The Pigouvian Constitution

88 U. Chi. L. Rev. (Forthcoming 2021)

75 Pages Posted: 5 Feb 2021 Last revised: 26 Apr 2022

See all articles by Peter Salib

Peter Salib

University of Houston Law Center

Date Written: December 16, 2020

Abstract

How can lawmakers reduce the skyrocketing rate of gun death in the United States? How can they stymie the spread of viral fake news stories designed to undermine our elections? Certain constitutionally-protected activities—like owning a gun or speaking online—can generate social harms. Yet when lawmakers enact regulations to reduce those harms, they are regularly struck down as unconstitutional. Indeed, it is the very laws designed to most aggressively reduce social harms—like total criminal bans—that are the least likely to be upheld. As a result, regulators appear stuck with an unpleasant choice—regulate constitutionally or effectively, but not both.

This article proposes a novel solution: Pigouvian taxation. A Pigouvian tax is an economic tool whereby people are required to bear the social costs of their own activity, rather than forcing others to do so. In important cases, Pigouvian taxes can thread the needle that traditional regulations have not, reducing serious social costs while respecting constitutional protections of individual rights. This is because many constitutional tests—for example, strict scrutiny’s “narrow tailoring” requirement—implicitly reflect the very kind of economic thinking on which Pigouvian taxes rely. In short, constitutional doctrines protecting individual activity do not require society to implicitly subsidize such activity by absorbing any and all costs it generates. Legitimate social costs may be regulated. But regulations must maintain a careful proportionality between the constitutional burdens they impose and the social harms they seek to eliminate. Pigouvian taxes, unlike traditional command-and-control rules, are inherently well-suited to such tailoring. Thus, in areas—like guns and speech—where traditional rules have been difficult or impossible to adequately tailor, Pigouvian taxation presents an important new regulatory tool.

Keywords: constitutional law, law and economics, Pigouvian taxes, first amendment, second amendment, free speech, guns

Suggested Citation

Salib, Peter, The Pigouvian Constitution (December 16, 2020). 88 U. Chi. L. Rev. (Forthcoming 2021), Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3750216 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3750216

Peter Salib (Contact Author)

University of Houston Law Center ( email )

4104 Martin Luther King Blvd.
Houston, TX 77204
United States

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