The Post-Chicago Antitrust Revolution: A Retrospective

27 Pages Posted: 17 Dec 2020 Last revised: 10 Feb 2021

See all articles by Christopher S. Yoo

Christopher S. Yoo

University of Pennsylvania Law School; University of Pennsylvania - Annenberg School for Communication; University of Pennsylvania - School of Engineering and Applied Science

Date Written: 2020

Abstract

A symposium examining the contributions of the post-Chicago School provides an appropriate opportunity to offer some thoughts on both the past and the future of antitrust. This afterword reviews the excellent papers with an eye toward appreciating the contributions and limitations of both the Chicago School, in terms of promoting the consumer welfare standard and embracing price theory as the preferred mode of economic analysis, and the post-Chicago School, with its emphasis on game theory and firm-level strategic conduct. It then explores two emerging trends, specifically neo-Brandeisian advocacy for abandoning consumer welfare as the sole goal of antitrust and the increasing emphasis on empirical analyses.

Keywords: Antitrust law & policy, competition, political economy, economic theory, empiricism, intellectual history, consumer welfare, economic efficiency, price theory, Chicago & Harvard Schools

JEL Classification: B21, D40, K21, L40

Suggested Citation

Yoo, Christopher S., The Post-Chicago Antitrust Revolution: A Retrospective (2020). University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 168, p. 2145, 2020, U of Penn, Inst for Law & Econ Research Paper No. 21-02, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3750218

Christopher S. Yoo (Contact Author)

University of Pennsylvania Law School ( email )

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HOME PAGE: http://www.law.upenn.edu/faculty/csyoo/

University of Pennsylvania - Annenberg School for Communication ( email )

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(215) 746-8772 (Phone)

University of Pennsylvania - School of Engineering and Applied Science ( email )

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United States
(215) 746-8772 (Phone)

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