Legislative Sanctions and the Strategic Environment of Judicial Review

Posted: 24 Feb 2003

See all articles by Keith E. Whittington

Keith E. Whittington

Princeton University - Department of Political Science

Abstract

This paper elaborates a model of the political decision to sanction courts for their exercise of the power of judicial review. The paper examines the logic for why elected officials might preserve, and when they might subvert, an independent judiciary armed with the power of constitutional review. The paper identifies several reasons why legislators might value independent judicial review, and identifies the circumstances in which the political costs of such review would outweigh its political benefits. The argument is illustrated in the historical experience of court-curbing activities in the U.S. Congress.

JEL Classification: K19, K39, K40

Suggested Citation

Whittington, Keith E., Legislative Sanctions and the Strategic Environment of Judicial Review. I-Con: The International Journal of Constitutional Law, Vol. 1, July 2003. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=375140

Keith E. Whittington (Contact Author)

Princeton University - Department of Political Science ( email )

Corwin Hall
Princeton, NJ 08544-1012
United States
609-258-3453 (Phone)
609-258-1110 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.princeton.edu/~kewhitt/

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