The Market Structure of Dealer-to-Client Interest Rate Swaps

47 Pages Posted: 26 Feb 2021

See all articles by Mohammadreza Bolandnazar

Mohammadreza Bolandnazar

Columbia University - Columbia Business School

Date Written: December 20, 2020

Abstract

Following the Dodd-Frank Act, central clearing and centralized trading became mandatory for a class of the most liquid interest rate swaps (IRS). Nevertheless, IRS market making in the dealer-to-client sector remained concentrated at a few regulated banks that transfer their funding costs to end users. I develop an equilibrium model of IRS markets with imperfect competition among capital-constrained dealers. Using proprietary data on cleared IRS transactions and the dealers' daily margin requirements, I empirically investigate the impact of recent regulatory changes on market liquidity. By exploiting the variation in margin requirements across swaps with different risk profiles intermediated by bank-affiliated dealers, my estimates show that a 1 percentage point increase in the supplementary leverage ratio (SLR) leads to an increase of $1.5 billion in the annual cost of hedging for the end-users.

Suggested Citation

Bolandnazar, Mohammadreza, The Market Structure of Dealer-to-Client Interest Rate Swaps (December 20, 2020). Columbia Business School Research Paper Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3752367 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3752367

Mohammadreza Bolandnazar (Contact Author)

Columbia University - Columbia Business School ( email )

3022 Broadway
New York, NY 10027
United States

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