On Strategy-proofness and the Salience of Single-peakedness in a Private Goods Economy

ISER DP No. 1112

34 Pages Posted: 1 Feb 2021

See all articles by Shurojit Chatterji

Shurojit Chatterji

Singapore Management University - School of Economics

Jordi Massó

Autonomous University of Barcelona - Department of Economics and Economic History

Shigehiro Serizawa

Osaka University - Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)

Date Written: December 11, 2020

Abstract

We consider strategy-proof rules operating on a rich domain of preference profiles in a set up where multiple private goods have to be assigned to a set of agents with entitlements where preferences display satiation. We show that if the rule is in addition "desirable", in that it is tops-only, continuous, same-sided and individually rational with respect to the entitlements, then the preferences in the domain have to satisfy a variant of single-peakedness (referred to as semilattice single-peakedness). We also provide a converse of this main finding. It turns out that this domain coincides with the one already identified in a general set up with a public good. Finally, we relate semilattice single-peaked domains to well-known restricted domains under which strategy-proof and desirable rules do exist.

Keywords: Strategy-proofness, Semilattice Single-peakedness

JEL Classification: D71

Suggested Citation

Chatterji, Shurojit and Massó Carreras, Jordi and Serizawa, Shigehiro, On Strategy-proofness and the Salience of Single-peakedness in a Private Goods Economy (December 11, 2020). ISER DP No. 1112, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3752481 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3752481

Shurojit Chatterji

Singapore Management University - School of Economics ( email )

90 Stamford Road
178903
Singapore

Jordi Massó Carreras

Autonomous University of Barcelona - Department of Economics and Economic History ( email )

Edifici B - Campus Bellaterra
Barcelona, 08193
Spain
34-93-5812370 or 34-93-5812461 (Phone)
34-93-5812012 (Fax)

Shigehiro Serizawa (Contact Author)

Osaka University - Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER) ( email )

6-1 Mihogaoka
Ibaraki, Osaka 567-0047
Japan
+81 6 6879 8558 (Phone)
+81 6 6878 2766 (Fax)

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