Modeling and Measuring Russian Corporate Governance: The Case of Russian Preferred and Common Shares

43 Pages Posted: 7 Feb 2003 Last revised: 9 Oct 2009

See all articles by William N. Goetzmann

William N. Goetzmann

Yale School of Management - International Center for Finance; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Andrey Ukhov

Cornell University

Matthew I. Spiegel

Yale University - Yale School of Management, International Center for Finance

Date Written: February 2003

Abstract

This paper examines governance explanations for the discount of preferred shares to common shares in the Russian market. conflicts between shareholder classes may help explain the discount. However, for this to be the sole explanation the estimated models suggest that the magnitude of future adverse shareholder events would have to be very high. Nevertheless, evidence of a common factor potentially related to governance seems evident in the date, implying that corporate control issues may at least be partially responsible for the observed preferred share discount

Suggested Citation

Goetzmann, William N. and Ukhov, Andrey and Spiegel, Matthew I., Modeling and Measuring Russian Corporate Governance: The Case of Russian Preferred and Common Shares (February 2003). NBER Working Paper No. w9469. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=375321

William N. Goetzmann (Contact Author)

Yale School of Management - International Center for Finance ( email )

165 Whitney Ave.
P.O. Box 208200
New Haven, CT 06520-8200
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203-432-5950 (Phone)
203-436-9252 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://viking.som.yale.edu

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
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Andrey Ukhov

Cornell University ( email )

Ithaca, NY 14853
United States

Matthew I. Spiegel

Yale University - Yale School of Management, International Center for Finance ( email )

135 Prospect Street
P.O. Box 208200
New Haven, CT 06520-8200
United States
203-432-6017 (Phone)
203-432-8931 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://som.yale.edu/~spiegel

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