Share repurchases, undervaluation, and corporate social responsibility

81 Pages Posted: 28 Jan 2021 Last revised: 3 Dec 2024

See all articles by Nils Bobenhausen

Nils Bobenhausen

RWTH Aachen University - Chair for Business Administration, particularly Business Finance

Wolfgang Breuer

RWTH Aachen University

Andreas Knetsch

Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE; RWTH Aachen University

Luis Maria Siemer

RWTH Aachen University

Date Written: October 18, 2024

Abstract

This study examines how firms’ socially responsible behavior relates to the timing of their share repurchases, considering share mispricing and the resulting wealth transfer between sellers and ongoing shareholders. We hypothesize that firms with a stronger commitment to societal goals prioritize the interests of all stakeholders more equally than those with a weaker commitment. Therefore, their managers are less likely to take advantage of the wealth transfer from selling to ongoing shareholders, which occurs when the firm is undervalued. Our results show that firms with higher corporate social responsibility (CSR) engagement, ceteris paribus, announce repurchases during periods of lower undervaluation. Additional analyses show that this effect is more pronounced when investor protection is stronger at the country level. Moreover, higher institutional ownership increases the relevance of undervaluation in buyback decisions and the distribution of excess cash is a relatively more important reason for share repurchases when firms display higher CSR engagement. Overall, our findings demonstrate that firms that generally act in a socially responsible manner also refrain from exploiting sellers for the benefit of ongoing investors.

Keywords: share repurchase, corporate social responsibility, misvaluation

JEL Classification: G15, G35, M14

Suggested Citation

Bobenhausen, Nils and Breuer, Wolfgang and Knetsch, Andreas and Siemer, Luis Maria,

Share repurchases, undervaluation, and corporate social responsibility

(October 18, 2024). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3754283 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3754283

Nils Bobenhausen

RWTH Aachen University - Chair for Business Administration, particularly Business Finance ( email )

Templergraben 64
Aachen, 52056
Germany

Wolfgang Breuer

RWTH Aachen University ( email )

Templergraben 55
D-52056 Aachen, 52056
Germany

Andreas Knetsch (Contact Author)

Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE ( email )

(http://www.safe-frankfurt.de)
Theodor-W.-Adorno-Platz 3
Frankfurt am Main, 60323
Germany

RWTH Aachen University ( email )

Templergraben 55
52056 Aachen, 52056
Germany

Luis Maria Siemer

RWTH Aachen University ( email )

Templergraben 55
52056 Aachen, 52056
Germany

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