Strategic conformity or anticonformity to avoid punishment and attract reward

85 Pages Posted: 27 Feb 2021 Last revised: 20 Feb 2024

See all articles by Fabian Dvorak

Fabian Dvorak

University of Konstanz - Faculty of Economics and Statistics; Eawag, Swiss Federal Institute of Aquatic Science and Technology

Urs Fischbacher

University of Konstanz - Faculty of Economics and Statistics

Katrin Schmelz

University of Konstanz - Faculty of Economics and Statistics

Date Written: August 02, 2024

Abstract

We provide systematic insights on strategic conformist - as well as anticonformist - behavior in situations where people are evaluated, i.e., where an individual has to be selected for reward (e.g., promotion) or punishment (e.g., layoffs). To affect the probability of being selected, people may attempt to fit in or stand out in order to affect the chances of being noticed or liked by the evaluator. We investigate such strategic incentives for conformity or anticonformity experimentally in three different domains: facts, taste, and creativity. To distinguish conformity and anticonformity from independence, we introduce a new experimental design that allows us to predict participants' independent choices based on transitivity. We find that the prospect of punishment increases conformity, while the prospect of reward reduces it. Anticonformity emerges in the prospect of reward, but only under specific circumstances. Similarity-based selection (i.e., homophily) is much more important for the evaluators' decisions than salience. We also employ a theoretical approach to illustrate strategic key mechanisms of our experimental setting.

Keywords: anticonformity, conformity, homophily, salience, transitivity, evaluation, reward, punishment JEL Classification: C81, C92, D83, D91

JEL Classification: C81, C92, D83, D91

Suggested Citation

Dvorak, Fabian and Fischbacher, Urs and Schmelz, Katrin, Strategic conformity or anticonformity to avoid punishment and attract reward (August 02, 2024). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3754595 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3754595

Fabian Dvorak (Contact Author)

University of Konstanz - Faculty of Economics and Statistics ( email )

Universitaetsstr. 10
78457 Konstanz
Germany

Eawag, Swiss Federal Institute of Aquatic Science and Technology ( email )

Überlandstrasse 133
Dübendorf, 8600
Switzerland

Urs Fischbacher

University of Konstanz - Faculty of Economics and Statistics ( email )

Universitaetsstr. 10
78457 Konstanz
Germany

Katrin Schmelz

University of Konstanz - Faculty of Economics and Statistics ( email )

Universitaetsstr. 10
78457 Konstanz
Germany

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