Is a Friend in Need a Friend Indeed? How Relationship Borrowers Fare during the COVID-19 Crisis

32 Pages Posted: 28 Dec 2020 Last revised: 22 Apr 2025

See all articles by Allen N. Berger

Allen N. Berger

University of South Carolina - Darla Moore School of Business

Christa H. S. Bouwman

Texas A&M University; Wharton Financial Institutions Center

Lars Norden

Getulio Vargas Foundation (FGV) - Brazilian School of Public and Business Administration (EBAPE); Getulio Vargas Foundation (FGV) - FGV/EPGE Escola Brasileira de Economia e Finanças

Raluca A. Roman

Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia

Gregory F. Udell

Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Finance

Teng Wang

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; Johns Hopkins University

Date Written: April 15, 2025

Abstract

We challenge the existing relationship lending literature on how banks manage their relationships with corporate borrowers during crises. We test theories of intertemporal smoothing during the closure period of COVID-19 crisis when borrowers are in great need of relationship benefits. We find that relationship borrowers receive worse rather than more favorable loan contract terms than others during this period. These and other results provide novel evidence on the functioning of relationship lending during a pandemic and contrast existing evidence gleaned from banking and financial crises.

Keywords: Banks, relationship lending, loan contract terms, financial crises, COVID-19

JEL Classification: G01, G21, G28

Suggested Citation

Berger, Allen N. and Bouwman, Christa H. S. and Norden, Lars and Roman, Raluca A. and Udell, Gregory F. and Wang, Teng, Is a Friend in Need a Friend Indeed? How Relationship Borrowers Fare during the COVID-19 Crisis (April 15, 2025). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3755243 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3755243

Allen N. Berger

University of South Carolina - Darla Moore School of Business ( email )

1014 Greene St.
Columbia, SC 29208
United States
803-576-8440 (Phone)
803-777-6876 (Fax)

Christa H. S. Bouwman

Texas A&M University ( email )

360H Wehner
College Station, TX 77843-4218
United States
979-845-3514 (Phone)
979-845-3514 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://people.tamu.edu/~cbouwman/

Wharton Financial Institutions Center

2306 Steinberg Hall-Dietrich Hall
3620 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States

Lars Norden

Getulio Vargas Foundation (FGV) - Brazilian School of Public and Business Administration (EBAPE) ( email )

Rua Jornalista Orlando Dantas 30
Rio de Janeiro, 22231-010
Brazil
+552130832431 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.larsnorden.de

Getulio Vargas Foundation (FGV) - FGV/EPGE Escola Brasileira de Economia e Finanças ( email )

Praia de Botafogo 190/1125, CEP
Rio de Janeiro RJ 22253-900
Brazil

Raluca A. Roman

Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia ( email )

Ten Independence Mall
Philadelphia, PA 19106-1574
United States

Gregory F. Udell

Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Finance ( email )

1309 E. 10th St.
Bloomington, IN 47405
United States

Teng Wang (Contact Author)

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System ( email )

20th Street and Constitution Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20551
United States

Johns Hopkins University ( email )

100 International Drive
Baltimore, MD Maryland 21202
United States

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