Homo moralis goes to the voting booth: coordination and information aggregation

36 Pages Posted: 18 Feb 2021 Last revised: 21 Feb 2021

See all articles by Ingela Alger

Ingela Alger

University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE); CNRS UMR 5314 TSE-R; Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse

Jean Francois Laslier

Paris School of Economics (PSE)

Date Written: November 30, 2020

Abstract

This paper revisits two classical problems in the theory of voting—viz. the divided majority problem and the strategic revelation of information by majority vote—in the light of evolutionarily founded partial Kantian morality. It is shown that, compared to electorates consisting of purely self-interested voters, such Kantian morality helps vot- ers solve coordination problems and improves the information aggregation properties of equilibria, even for modest levels of morality.

Keywords: voting, Homo moralis, Kantian morality, social dilemmas, divided majority problem, Condorcet jury theorem

JEL Classification: D72

Suggested Citation

Alger, Ingela and Laslier, Jean Francois, Homo moralis goes to the voting booth: coordination and information aggregation (November 30, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3756263 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3756263

Ingela Alger (Contact Author)

University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) ( email )

Place Anatole-France
Toulouse Cedex, F-31042
France

CNRS UMR 5314 TSE-R ( email )

France

Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse ( email )

31015 Toulouse, Cedex 6
France

Jean Francois Laslier

Paris School of Economics (PSE) ( email )

48 Boulevard Jourdan
Paris, 75014 75014
France

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