The Labor Effects of Pro-Labor Bias in Bankruptcy

46 Pages Posted: 19 Jan 2021 Last revised: 28 Mar 2021

See all articles by Aloisio Pessoa de Araujo

Aloisio Pessoa de Araujo

Getulio Vargas Foundation (FGV) - Escola de Pos-Graduacao (EPGE) and IMPA

Rafael Ferreira

University of São Paulo (FEA-USP) - Department of Economics

Spyridon Lagaras

University of Pittsburgh, Katz Graduate Business School

Flavio Moraes

Getulio Vargas Foundation (FGV) - FGV/EPGE Escola Brasileira de Economia e Finanças

Jacopo Ponticelli

Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management; NBER

Margarita Tsoutsoura

Cornell University; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Date Written: December 29, 2020

Abstract

Judicial decisions in bankruptcy are often influenced by the goal to preserve employment in financially distressed firms. What are the effects of these pro-labor decisions on workers' earnings and employment trajectories? We construct a new court-level measure of pro-labor bias based on the text of judicial decisions and exploit the random assignment of cases to courts within judicial districts in the state of Sao Paulo in Brazil to study the effect of pro-labor bias on labor market outcomes. We find that workers of firms assigned to high-pro-labor courts experience 4.4% lower post-bankruptcy earnings. This negative effect is primarily driven by wage adjustment rather than the probability of employment, and it is persistent in the five-year period after bankruptcy. We discuss several mechanisms that can drive this result.

Keywords: bankruptcy, reorganization, liquidation, pro-labor

JEL Classification: G33, G20, K10

Suggested Citation

Araujo, Aloisio Pessoa de and Ferreira, Rafael and Lagaras, Spyridon and Moraes, Flavio and Ponticelli, Jacopo and Tsoutsoura, Margarita, The Labor Effects of Pro-Labor Bias in Bankruptcy (December 29, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3757117 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3757117

Aloisio Pessoa de Araujo

Getulio Vargas Foundation (FGV) - Escola de Pos-Graduacao (EPGE) and IMPA ( email )

R. Dr. Neto de Araujo 320 cj 1307
Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro 22250-900
Brazil

Rafael Ferreira

University of São Paulo (FEA-USP) - Department of Economics ( email )

Av. Prof. Luciano Gualberto 908
Sao Paulo
Brazil

Spyridon Lagaras

University of Pittsburgh, Katz Graduate Business School ( email )

3950 Roberto Clemente Dr
334 Mervis Hall
Pittsburgh, PA Allegheny 15260
United States

Flavio Moraes

Getulio Vargas Foundation (FGV) - FGV/EPGE Escola Brasileira de Economia e Finanças ( email )

Praia de Botafogo 190/1125, CEP
Rio de Janeiro RJ 22253-900
Brazil

Jacopo Ponticelli

Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management ( email )

2211 Campus Dr
Evanston, IL 60208
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/faculty/ponticelli/index.html

NBER ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Margarita Tsoutsoura (Contact Author)

Cornell University ( email )

Ithaca, NY 14853
United States

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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