Taxes and Firm Investment

25 Pages Posted: 19 Jan 2021

See all articles by K. Peren Arin

K. Peren Arin

Zayed University; Australian National University (ANU) - Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis (CAMA)

Kevin Devereux

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Mieszko Mazur

ESSCA school of management

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: January 1, 2021

Abstract

We investigate the firm level investment responses to narrative shocks to average personal and corporate tax rates using a universal micro dataset of publicly traded U.S firms for the post- 1962 period. By allowing for heterogeneous effects over the business cycle and accompanying monetary policy regime, as well as over firm-level characteristics, we show that : (i) corporate tax multipliers are negative overall, but this result is driven by smaller firms who face larger borrowing constraints, especially during high-unemployment periods or when the accompanying monetary policy is contractionary; (ii) while the magnitude and the significance of personal income tax multipliers are smaller on the aggregate, there is some evidence of positive personal tax multipliers in high-unemployment state by large (dividend-paying) firms, which is consistent with the recent literature.

Keywords: Fiscal Policy, Corporate Tax, Corporate Investment, Taxation, Investment, Tax Policy, Heterogenous Effects

JEL Classification: E62, E32, E22, H25, G31, G38

Suggested Citation

Arin, Kerim Peren and Devereux, Kevin and Mazur, Mieszko, Taxes and Firm Investment (January 1, 2021). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3758433 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3758433

Kerim Peren Arin (Contact Author)

Zayed University ( email )

P.O. Box 4783
Abu Dhabi
United Arab Emirates

Australian National University (ANU) - Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis (CAMA) ( email )

ANU College of Business and Economics
Canberra, Australian Capital Territory 0200
Australia

Kevin Devereux

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Mieszko Mazur

ESSCA school of management ( email )

55 Quai Alphonse le Gallo
Boulogne-Billancourt, 92513
France

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