Pillar One Tax Games

Eden, Lorraine

Pillar One Tax Games

Tax Management International Journal, Vol. 50, No.1 (January 2021). Reproduced with permission from Bloomberg Tax. Copyright 2021 by The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc. (800-372-1033). http://www.bna.com.

11 Pages Posted: 2 Feb 2021

See all articles by Lorraine Eden

Lorraine Eden

Dept of Management, Mays Business School, Texas A&M University ; School of Law, Texas A&M University

Date Written: January 2, 2021

Abstract

The OECD’s Pillar One Blueprint proposes a new taxing right, Amount A, that would shift the pre-tax profits of multinational enterprises (MNEs) from Residence and Source jurisdictions to Market jurisdictions. The Amount A formula provides multiple opportunities for both MNEs and tax jurisdictions to engage in “tax games” that would increase the overall complexity of the international tax system. This article explores some of the possible tax games implicit in both the Amount A formula and the four-step process for identifying “tax-relieving” jurisdictions. Two numerical case studies provide examples of the possible Pillar One tax games, and highlight the resulting increase in tax complexity and tax uncertainty.

Keywords: transfer pricing, international tax, OECD, BEPS, Pillar One, digital economy, tax complexity, tax uncertainty

JEL Classification: F23, H25, H26, K34, K420, K330, L11

Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation

Eden, Lorraine, Pillar One Tax Games (January 2, 2021). Tax Management International Journal, Vol. 50, No.1 (January 2021). Reproduced with permission from Bloomberg Tax. Copyright 2021 by The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc. (800-372-1033). http://www.bna.com. , Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3758671