Monopolistic Provision of Excludable Public Goods Under Private Information

18 Pages Posted: 19 Feb 2003

See all articles by Patrick W. Schmitz

Patrick W. Schmitz

University of Cologne; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

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Abstract

This paper characterizes the optimal contract designed by a profit-maximizing monopolist, who can provide an indivisible and excludable public good to a group of n potential consumers, whose valuations are private information. The analysis takes distribution costs and congestion effects into account. The second-best allocation rule, which is welfare-maximizing under the constraint of non-negative profits, is characterized. Properties of the optimal mechanism in the case of many potential consumers are analyzed and it is shown that in this case the monopolist can use simple posted-price contracts. Finally, implications for public intervention are discussed.

Keywords: excludable public goods, asymmetric information

JEL Classification: D82, H41

Suggested Citation

Schmitz, Patrick W., Monopolistic Provision of Excludable Public Goods Under Private Information. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=376120 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.376120

Patrick W. Schmitz (Contact Author)

University of Cologne ( email )

Albertus-Magnus-Platz
Cologne, 50923
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://schmitz.uni-koeln.de/index.php?s=mitarbeiter&t=schmitz

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

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