The Decline of Religion and Its Rise in Electoral Politics: Religious Belief, Religious Practice, and the Strength of Religious Voting Cleavages

Comparative Political Studies

64 Pages Posted: 18 Feb 2021 Last revised: 10 May 2023

See all articles by John Huber

John Huber

Columbia University

Ahmed Ezzeldin Mohamed

Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse (IAST), Toulouse School of Economics

Date Written: April 24, 2021

Abstract

Economic development has been linked to a declining importance of religion. But alongside secularization, there has been an increased salience of religion in electoral politics. These seemingly contradictory trends can be understood by distinguishing between two dimensions of religiosity: religious belief and church attendance. We show that religious voting cleavages are strongest in democracies where there is religious cohesion, which means belief and practice go hand-in-hand. Voting cleavages require group members to have distinctive policy preferences and be politically engaged. Strong religious beliefs are associated with distinctive policy preferences (but not with political engagement), and church attendance is associated with political engagement. Thus, religious cohesion provides the key ingredients for a religious political cleavage. But what explains variation in religious cohesion in democracies? We find that religious cohesion increases with economic security. Thus, economic security can promote secularization, but also facilitate the religious cohesion associated with strong religious voting cleavages.

Keywords: religious cleavages, religion, economic development

Suggested Citation

Huber, John and Mohamed, Ahmed Ezzeldin, The Decline of Religion and Its Rise in Electoral Politics: Religious Belief, Religious Practice, and the Strength of Religious Voting Cleavages (April 24, 2021). Comparative Political Studies, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3762195 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3762195

John Huber

Columbia University ( email )

3022 Broadway
New York, NY 10027
United States

Ahmed Ezzeldin Mohamed (Contact Author)

Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse (IAST), Toulouse School of Economics ( email )

Toulouse, F-31042
France

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