Common Ownership and Entrepreneurship

10 Pages Posted: 9 Mar 2021

See all articles by Ofer Eldar

Ofer Eldar

University of California, Berkeley - School of Law; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Halle Institute for Economic Research

Jillian Grennan

Emory University

Date Written: January 8, 2021

Abstract

We complement the literature on common ownership by presenting two new observations from entrepreneurial startups. First, given the increase in common ownership of startups by VC investors, inclusion of high-value startups in standard common ownership measures may actually increase aggregate measures of common ownership. Second, we suggest that even if public-firm common ownership leads to collusive inefficiency and higher prices in the short-term, it may also create opportunities for entry of innovative high-growth startups. Consistent with this, we document that entrepreneurial activity and common ownership of startups tends to be higher in industries with higher common ownership among public firms.

Keywords: Entrepreneurship, Startups, Private Firms, Corporate Governance, Common Ownership, Competition, Innovation, Entry

JEL Classification: G32, G24, L11, L41, O31

Suggested Citation

Eldar, Ofer and Grennan, Jillian, Common Ownership and Entrepreneurship (January 8, 2021). AEA Papers and Proceedings, Duke Law School Public Law & Legal Theory Series No. 2021-25, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3762218 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3762218

Ofer Eldar

University of California, Berkeley - School of Law ( email )

215 Law Building
Berkeley, CA 94720-7200
United States

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Halle Institute for Economic Research ( email )

P.O. Box 11 03 61
Kleine Maerkerstrasse 8
D-06017 Halle, 06108
Germany

Jillian Grennan (Contact Author)

Emory University ( email )

Rich Memorial Building
1602 Fishburne Dr
Atlanta, GA 30307
United States

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