No Accountability without Transparency and Consistency: Redistricting-by-Formula in Mexico

49 Pages Posted: 18 Feb 2021

See all articles by Alejandro Trelles

Alejandro Trelles

Brandeis University

Micah Altman

Center for Research in Equitable and Open Scholarship, MIT

Eric Magar

Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM) - Political Science Department

Michael P. McDonald

George Mason University - Government and Politics; University of Florida

Date Written: January 7, 2021

Abstract

An independent bureaucracy has carried out automated redistricting processes in Mexico since 1996. However, the process of “fine-tuning” the plans that are initially produced by formula is conducted behind closed doors where parties and experts are allowed to offer proposals. This raises questions about the necessary conditions required for a bureaucracy to operate in a transparent, consistent, and accountable manner. Our research examines this question through the analysis of private records that trace the bargaining process that takes place between parties and bureaucrats. Our results uncover substantial gaps in consistency. We highlight the strengths of the process and offer policy recommendations that can help improve the quality of redistricting in Mexico and in countries cyclically renewing their electoral geography.

Keywords: electoral management, independence, integrity, redistricting, optimization, transparency, accountability

Suggested Citation

Trelles, Alejandro and Altman, Micah and Magar, Eric and McDonald, Michael P. and McDonald, Michael P., No Accountability without Transparency and Consistency: Redistricting-by-Formula in Mexico (January 7, 2021). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3762805 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3762805

Alejandro Trelles (Contact Author)

Brandeis University ( email )

415 South Street
Politics Department, MS 058, Brandeis University
Waltham, MA MA 01742
United States
7817365336 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.alejandrotrelles.com/

Micah Altman

Center for Research in Equitable and Open Scholarship, MIT ( email )

77 Massachusetts Avenue
50 Memorial Drive
Cambridge, MA 02139-4307
United States

HOME PAGE: http://micahaltman.com

Eric Magar

Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM) - Political Science Department ( email )

Rio Hondo 1
Col. Tizapan San-Angel
Mexico City, D.F. 01000
Mexico
525556284079 (Phone)
525554904674 (Fax)

Michael P. McDonald

University of Florida ( email )

PO Box 117165, 201 Stuzin Hall
Gainesville, FL 32610-0496
United States

George Mason University - Government and Politics ( email )

4400 University Drive
Fairfax, VA 22030
United States

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
50
Abstract Views
369
PlumX Metrics