Corruption Bias and Information: A Study in the Lab

40 Pages Posted: 12 Jan 2021

See all articles by Germana Corrado

Germana Corrado

University of Rome, Tor Vergata - Department of Management and Law

Luisa Corrado

University of Rome Tor Vergata Department of Economics and Finance

Francesca Marazzi

CEIS, University of Rome Tor Vergata

Date Written: January 12, 2021

Abstract

Our study examines whether actual corruption, measured by individuals direct experience of corruption episodes (bribery), matches their perceptions of the phenomenon. Our experimental participants play a repeated public good game with mandatory minimum contribution and are given the possibility to bribe a computerized bureaucrat in order to free-ride. We elicit beliefs about the perceived level of corruptibility of the bureaucrat and others' corruption attempts. We study participants' willingness to corrupt and the gap between perceived and actual corruption under two information conditions. Results show that, although anonymous, spreading news about an attempt of corruption is enough to discourage such attempts, lowering the corruption rate. Consequently, when receiving no information, participants expect others to corrupt more, raising the index of perceived corruption.

Keywords: Perceived and Experienced Corruption, Lab Experiment, Information

JEL Classification: D73, C92, H41, D90

Suggested Citation

Corrado, Germana and Corrado, Luisa and Marazzi, Francesca, Corruption Bias and Information: A Study in the Lab (January 12, 2021). CEIS Working Paper No. 505, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3764864 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3764864

Germana Corrado

University of Rome, Tor Vergata - Department of Management and Law ( email )

Rome
Italy

Luisa Corrado (Contact Author)

University of Rome Tor Vergata Department of Economics and Finance ( email )

Via Columbia n.2
Rome, rome 00100
Italy

Francesca Marazzi

CEIS, University of Rome Tor Vergata ( email )

Via Columbia 2
Rome, Lazio 00133
Italy

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