Managerial Rationality in Global Governance: Driving Legal Behaviour through Indicators

International Journal of Law in Context, 13,4 pp. 465–484 (2017)

HEC Paris Research Paper No. LAW-2021-1415

28 Pages Posted: 10 Mar 2021 Last revised: 19 Jan 2022

Date Written: 2017

Abstract

Managerial devices are rapidly developing as a means for driving the legal behaviour of organisations, including those of states and corporations. This article explores the managerial rationality underpinning global legal indicators, and the constraints they convey on legal behaviour. In particular, it argues that indicators are better understood as part of a system of management control and distributed governance, which is steadily eroding state-centred forms of authority, including state law. In this context, legitimacy and reactivity are contingent to their cycle of production and implementation, which is fourfold: data-collecting, benchmarking, auditing and allocating incentives. Each process is meant to generate respectively subjectification, self-knowledge by comparison, accountability and stimulus for action. Indicators with higher degrees of legitimacy become entrenched in institutional practices and legal decision-making processes. The article concludes that regulatory spaces where indicators unfold need critical and political scrutiny to expose their pernicious effects, undesirable uses, and inevitable misuses.

Keywords: Indicators, management, data-cycle, legitimacy

JEL Classification: K10, K20, K30, P17, P48, M40, M48, L10, L50

Suggested Citation

Restrepo-Amariles, David, Managerial Rationality in Global Governance: Driving Legal Behaviour through Indicators (2017). International Journal of Law in Context, 13,4 pp. 465–484 (2017) , HEC Paris Research Paper No. LAW-2021-1415, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3765382 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3765382

David Restrepo-Amariles (Contact Author)

HEC Paris - Tax & Law ( email )

1 rue de la Libération
Jouy-en-Josas Cedex, 78351
France

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