Do Shareholder Meetings Matter? Evidence from the Options Market

53 Pages Posted: 17 Feb 2021 Last revised: 10 Apr 2023

See all articles by Kateryna V. Holland

Kateryna V. Holland

University of Missouri - Trulaske College of Business

Chan Lim

Tulane University

Irene Yi

University of Toronto

Date Written: April 9, 2023


This paper examines the value and timing of information released during shareholder meetings using options. In contrast to studies that report insignificant market reactions around these meetings, we provide evidence that shareholder meetings indeed matter. We find that option implied volatility peaks around the record date and then gradually declines leading up to the meeting date. This indicates that financial market participants continuously learn information on meeting agendas and voting outcomes over the entire meeting cycle, rather than reacting on specific event dates. This decline is quantitatively substantial at 0.9%, varies by proposal topic and contentiousness level, and persists after controlling for voting premiums and borrowing fees. Our results imply that previous studies may have underestimated the importance of shareholder meetings by relying solely on event returns.

Keywords: shareholder meetings; shareholder proposals; management proposals; implied volatility; record date

JEL Classification: G14, G30, G34

Suggested Citation

Holland, Kateryna V. and Lim, Chan and Yi, Irene, Do Shareholder Meetings Matter? Evidence from the Options Market (April 9, 2023). Available at SSRN: or

Kateryna V. Holland (Contact Author)

University of Missouri - Trulaske College of Business ( email )

Robert J. Trulaske, Sr. College of Business
403 Cornell Hall
Columbia, MO 65211
United States

Chan Lim

Tulane University ( email )

7 McAlister Dr
New Orleans, LA 70118
United States

Irene Yi

University of Toronto ( email )


Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Abstract Views
PlumX Metrics