Federal Regulation and Mortality in the 50 States

36 Pages Posted: 14 Jan 2021

See all articles by James Broughel

James Broughel

Competitive Enterprise Institute (CEI)

Dustin Chambers

Salisbury University - Department of Economics and Finance; George Mason University - Mercatus Center

Date Written: January 11, 2021

Abstract

Previous research speculates that some regulations are counterproductive in the sense that they increase (rather than decrease) mortality risk. However, few empirical studies have measured the extent to which this phenomenon holds across the regulatory system as a whole. Using a novel US state panel dataset spanning the period 1995 to 2014, we estimate the impact of US federal regulation on state-level mortality. We find that a 1 percent increase in binding federal regulations increases our mortality index by between 0.53 and 1.35 percent. These findings are highly robust to the form of mortality measure, choice of covariates, and the inclusion/exclusion of various regions and states. This paper therefore fills an important gap in the empirical literature and boosts the credibility of mortality risk analysis, whereby public policymakers weigh both the expected lives saved and lost due to a proposed regulation.

Keywords: regulation, mortality, RegData, mortality risk analysis, cost-per-life-saved cutoff

JEL Classification: I18, K20, K32, L51

Suggested Citation

Broughel, James and Chambers, Dustin, Federal Regulation and Mortality in the 50 States (January 11, 2021). Mercatus Working Paper Series, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3765729 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3765729

James Broughel (Contact Author)

Competitive Enterprise Institute (CEI) ( email )

Dustin Chambers

Salisbury University - Department of Economics and Finance ( email )

Salisbury, MD 21801
United States

George Mason University - Mercatus Center

3434 Washington Blvd., 4th Floor
Arlington, VA 22201
United States

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