Research Exemption and Pharmaceutical Innovation: Evidence from China

45 Pages Posted: 10 Mar 2021

See all articles by C. Matthew Shi

C. Matthew Shi

The Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUHK) - Department of Economics

Yucong Zhao

Zhejiang University - College of Economics

Date Written: December 15, 2020

Abstract

The patent laws of many countries have ''research exemption'' provisions that exempt certain research-related uses of proprietary materials from patent infringement. By limiting the rights of existing patent holders, such rules are meant to facilitate follow-on innovation and benefit latecomer firms, especially in the pharmaceutical industry. In this paper, we provide the first study of the impact of the research exemption, exploiting unique features of the institutional setting in China. Using firm-level data from 2007 to 2018 and a difference-in-differences (DID) strategy, we find that the research exemption in China leads to a large increase in firms' R&D inputs. However, there is no evidence that the research exemption leads to more patents or improved productivity on average. Further analysis reveals that it only causes an increase in patents for few firms with large market power. Overall, our findings highlight the importance of understanding the relationship between firms' innovation and imitation strategies for the design of innovation policies.

Keywords: Research Exemption, R&D and Innovation, Imitation, Generic Drugs, Pharmaceutical Industry

JEL Classification: O31, O38, 025, L65

Suggested Citation

Shi, Ce Matthew and Zhao, Yucong, Research Exemption and Pharmaceutical Innovation: Evidence from China (December 15, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3766032 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3766032

Ce Matthew Shi (Contact Author)

The Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUHK) - Department of Economics ( email )

Shatin, N.T.
Hong Kong

Yucong Zhao

Zhejiang University - College of Economics ( email )

Yuquan Campus 38 Zheda Road
Hangzhou, Zhejiang 310027
China

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