Why Participation? Institutions and Inequality in Urban Politics

51 Pages Posted: 18 Feb 2021 Last revised: 21 Aug 2023

See all articles by David Foster

David Foster

Florida State University - Department of Political Science

Joseph Warren

University of Alaska, Anchorage

Date Written: June 09, 2024

Abstract

In land use policymaking, institutions for resident participation are common but often associated with stark inequalities. We argue that the observed connection between participatory institutions and political inequality arises due to the circumstances in which participatory institutions are established-not due to participation itself. In a formal model, residents of two districts compete to oppose a locally costly (but socially beneficial) proposal. Participatory institutions allow residents to send a costly signal of their preferences to a politician. The politician only establishes participatory institutions when they are moderately biased toward one district. When extremely biased, the politician unilaterally benefits one district at the other's expense; when sufficiently egalitarian, the politician allows each district to approve or veto projects themselves. We relate these results to the changing structure of urban politics in the wake of the Great Society. Despite justified concerns about inequalities in participation, eliminating participatory institutions may actually increase unequal policy outcomes.

Keywords: formal model, land use policy, nimbyism, participation, the Great Society

JEL Classification: H11, H77, R31, R52

Suggested Citation

Foster, David and Warren, Joseph, Why Participation? Institutions and Inequality in Urban Politics (June 09, 2024). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3768213 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3768213

David Foster (Contact Author)

Florida State University - Department of Political Science ( email )

Tallahassee, FL 30306
United States

Joseph Warren

University of Alaska, Anchorage ( email )

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