Communication and Social Preferences: An Experimental Analysis

42 Pages Posted: 26 Jan 2021

See all articles by Antonio Cabrales

Antonio Cabrales

University College London - Department of Economics

Francesco Feri

University of London - Royal Holloway College

Piero Gottardi

European University Institute - Department of Economics; Ca Foscari University of Venice - Dipartimento di Economia; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Miguel Meléndez-Jiménez

University of Malaga

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: 2021

Abstract

This paper reports on experiments regarding cheap talk games where senders attempt deception when their interests are not in conflict with those of the receiver. The amount of miscommunication is higher than in previous experimental findings on cheap talk games in situations where senders’ and receivers’ interests are not in conflict. We obtain this even though, as in previous literature, some participants appear to feature a cost of lying. We argue our findings could be attributed to distributional preferences of senders who lie to avoid the receiver getting a higher payoff than herself.

JEL Classification: D830, C720, G140

Suggested Citation

Cabrales, Antonio and Feri, Francesco and Gottardi, Piero and Meléndez-Jiménez, Miguel, Communication and Social Preferences: An Experimental Analysis (2021). CESifo Working Paper No. 8850, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3772091

Antonio Cabrales (Contact Author)

University College London - Department of Economics ( email )

Drayton House, 30 Gordon Street
30 Gordon Street
London, WC1H 0AX
United Kingdom

Francesco Feri

University of London - Royal Holloway College ( email )

Royal Holloway
University of London
Egham, TW200EX

HOME PAGE: http://francescoferi.xoom.it/

Piero Gottardi

European University Institute - Department of Economics ( email )

Villa Schifanoia
133 via Bocaccio
Firenze (Florence), Tuscany 50014
Italy

Ca Foscari University of Venice - Dipartimento di Economia ( email )

Cannaregio 873
Venice, 30121
Italy
+39 041 257 4192 (Phone)
+39 041 257 4176 (Fax)

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Miguel Meléndez-Jiménez

University of Malaga ( email )

Malaga, Málaga 29004
Spain

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
8
Abstract Views
57
PlumX Metrics