Critical Race Theory Meets Third World Approaches to International Law

Abstract

By and large, Critical Race Theory (CRT) and Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) exist in separate epistemic universes. This Article argues that the borders between these two fields are unwarranted. Specifically, the Article articulates six parallel ways in which CRT and TWAIL have exposed and challenged the racial dimensions of United States law and international law, respectively. It explores the related ways in which both CRT scholars and TWAIL scholars have: contested the legalization of white supremacy; marked and problematized the degree to which regimes of inclusion can operate as technologies of exclusion; staged important if non-identical critiques of colorblindness; engaged and repudiated neoliberal claims about racialized social responsibility and agency; confronted perceptions that both literatures exist outside the boundaries of the presumptively neutral scholarly conventions of constitutional law and international law, engendering either criticism or willful dis-attention or non-engagement by mainstream scholars; and remained invested in reconstruction and transformation of and within law, seeking to maximize its emancipatory potential for racial justice and equality even while remaining clear-eyed about the limits and costs of such engagement and the need to effectuate change in other arenas, such as social movements.

Keywords: Critical Race Theory (CRT), Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL), international law, constitutional law, racial justice, social responsibility