Gender and Bureaucratic Corruption: Evidence from Two Countries

18 Pages Posted: 1 Feb 2021 Last revised: 18 Nov 2021

See all articles by Francesco Decarolis

Francesco Decarolis

Bocconi University - Department of Economics

Raymond J. Fisman

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Boston University

Paolo Pinotti

Bocconi University - BAFFI Center on International Markets, Money, and Regulation

Silvia Vannutelli

Boston University

Yongxiang Wang

University of Southern California - Marshall School of Business

Date Written: January 2021

Abstract

We examine the correlation between gender and bureaucratic corruption using two distinct datasets, one from Italy and a second from China. In each case, we find that women are far less likely to be investigated for corruption than men. In our Italian data, female procurement officials are 34 percent less likely than men to be investigated for corruption by enforcement authorities; in China, female prefectural leaders are as much as 75 percent less likely to be arrested for corruption than men. While these represent correlations (rather than definitive causal effects), both are very robust relationships, which survive the inclusion of fine-grained individual and geographic controls.

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Suggested Citation

Decarolis, Francesco and Fisman, Raymond and Pinotti, Paolo and Vannutelli, Silvia and Wang, Yongxiang, Gender and Bureaucratic Corruption: Evidence from Two Countries (January 2021). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3776967 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3776967

Francesco Decarolis (Contact Author)

Bocconi University - Department of Economics ( email )

Via Gobbi 5
Milan, 20136
Italy

Raymond Fisman

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Boston University ( email )

595 Commonwealth Avenue
Boston, MA 02215
United States

Paolo Pinotti

Bocconi University - BAFFI Center on International Markets, Money, and Regulation ( email )

Milano, 20136
Italy

Silvia Vannutelli

Boston University

Yongxiang Wang

University of Southern California - Marshall School of Business ( email )

701 Exposition Blvd
Los Angeles, CA California 90089
United States

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