Ranked Choice Voting and Proportional Representation

58 Pages Posted: 18 Feb 2021 Last revised: 14 Jul 2022

See all articles by Gerdus Benade

Gerdus Benade

Boston University - Questrom School of Business

Ruth Buck

Pennsylvania State University - Penn State

Moon Duchin

Tufts University - Department of Mathematics

Dara Gold

RAND Corporation

Thomas Weighill

University of North Carolina (UNC) at Greensboro

Date Written: February 2, 2021

Abstract

It is widely claimed that ranked choice voting---and single transferable vote (STV) in particular---is conducive to proportional representation. In this paper, we clarify what might be precisely meant by that claim, and then offer confirmation: under a wide range of assumptions about voting behavior and electoral conditions, STV systems will likely secure roughly proportional outcomes, especially when compared to plurality elections in single-member districts (SMD). To do this, we develop novel data-driven methodology for generating ranked ballots in the presence of voter polarization. We demonstrate the methods on case studies from localities in Louisiana, North Carolina, Ohio, and Texas. We find that STV tends to project proportional or slightly higher representation for the relevant minority group in each case, while SMD varies widely in its effectiveness depending on local circumstances. This work brings a statistical modeling toolkit to the questions around ranked choice voting and proportionality, allowing considerations of voter blocs and cohesion to enter the conversation in new ways.

Keywords: ranked choice voting, proportional representation, Plackett-Luce, Bradley-Terry

Suggested Citation

Benade, Gerdus and Buck, Ruth and Duchin, Moon and Gold, Dara and Weighill, Thomas, Ranked Choice Voting and Proportional Representation (February 2, 2021). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3778021 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3778021

Gerdus Benade

Boston University - Questrom School of Business ( email )

595 Commonwealth Avenue
Boston, MA MA 02215
United States

Ruth Buck

Pennsylvania State University - Penn State ( email )

150 S. College St.
127F Lewis Katz Hall
Carlisle, PA 17013
United States

Moon Duchin

Tufts University - Department of Mathematics ( email )

Bromfield-Pearson Hall
503 Boston Avenue
Medford, MA
United States

Dara Gold

RAND Corporation ( email )

1776 Main Street
P.O. Box 2138
Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138
United States

Thomas Weighill (Contact Author)

University of North Carolina (UNC) at Greensboro ( email )

P.O.Box 26170
Greensboro, NC 27412
United States

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