Earnings Inequality in Production Networks

77 Pages Posted: 8 Feb 2021 Last revised: 2 Mar 2025

See all articles by Federico Huneeus

Federico Huneeus

Yale University; Central Bank of Chile

Kory Kroft

University of Toronto

Kevin Lim

University of Toronto

Date Written: February 2021

Abstract

Why do firms differ in the wages paid to otherwise identical workers and in the share of revenue that they allocate to labor? This paper explores the role of production networks. Using linked employer-employee and firm-to-firm trade transactions data from Chile, we show that firms with better access to both buyers and suppliers of intermediate inputs tend to have higher earnings premia and lower labor shares. Motivated by these facts, we develop and estimate a model with labor market power, worker and firm heterogeneity, and heterogeneity in firm-to-firm linkages in the production network. Greater access to larger buyers and more efficient suppliers raises the marginal revenue product of labor and lowers the relative cost of intermediates to labor. This leads to higher wages in the presence of labor market power and lower labor shares when labor and materials are substitutes. Through counterfactual simulations of the estimated model we find a substantial role for production networks in explaining the variances of earnings premia and labor shares across firms.

Suggested Citation

Huneeus, Federico and Kroft, Kory and Lim, Kevin, Earnings Inequality in Production Networks (February 2021). NBER Working Paper No. w28424, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3781311

Federico Huneeus (Contact Author)

Yale University ( email )

30 Hillhouse Avenue
New Haven, CT 06510
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.fedehuneeus.com

Central Bank of Chile ( email )

Agustinas 1180 Piso 3
Santiago
Chile

Kory Kroft

University of Toronto ( email )

105 St George Street
Toronto, Ontario M5S 3G8
Canada

Kevin Lim

University of Toronto ( email )

105 St George Street
Toronto, Ontario M5S 3G8
Canada

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