Designing Pro-Competitive Research Data Pools: Which EU Competition Remedies for Research Data Silos in Digital Markets?

Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies, 2020, 13(21), 161-186

26 Pages Posted: 18 Feb 2021

See all articles by Giulia Schneider

Giulia Schneider

Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies

Date Written: May 30, 2020

Abstract

The study moves from the assumption that the sharing of data can – under specific
circumstances – give rise to anticompetitive aggregations of research-valuable data in
the form of closed data silos. It addresses the question whether and how competition remedies available under EU law can be used for the design of pro-competitive data
pools in digital markets. Interesting suggestions for these purposes are given by the
recent enforcement policies enacted by the European Commission in high technology
innovation markets. Although aimed at restoring very different anticompetitive
conducts, these remedies nonetheless appear to share the common function of opening
up established innovation alliances for the transfer of research-valuable information
assets to external competing parties. Against this backdrop, the suitability of such
information-based remedies in the context of digital markets is questioned. The study
ultimately puts forward the opportunity of a close collaboration between competition
and data protection authorities for a joint governance of data sharing remedies.

Keywords: abuse; collaborative governance; data sharing; data silos; merger.

JEL Classification: K21

Suggested Citation

Schneider, Giulia, Designing Pro-Competitive Research Data Pools: Which EU Competition Remedies for Research Data Silos in Digital Markets? (May 30, 2020). Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies, 2020, 13(21), 161-186, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782562

Giulia Schneider (Contact Author)

Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies ( email )

Biblioteca Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna
Piazza Martiri della Liberta, n. 33
Pisa, 56127
Italy

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