Sustainable Voting Behavior of Asset Managers: Do They Walk the Walk?

41 Pages Posted: 11 Feb 2021 Last revised: 24 Feb 2021

See all articles by Wilma de Groot

Wilma de Groot

Robeco Institutional Asset Management

Jan de Koning

University of Amsterdam - Amsterdam Institute for Social Science Research (AISSR); Robeco Institutional Asset Management

Sebastian van Winkel

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Erasmus School of Economics (ESE)

Date Written: February 10, 2021

Abstract

We investigate asset manager characteristics that influence ESG voting patterns using a decade of voting data with more than 20 million observations. Asset managers predominantly vote against social and environmental proposals. Especially, large and passive asset managers vote the least in favor of these proposals and despite the increased attention to sustainability integration, they hardly vote more in favor of these proposals than a decade ago. Moreover, signatories of the PRI do not vote more often in favor of environmental and social issues. Our results have important implications for investors striving for direct impact on the sustainability agenda of corporates.

Keywords: Voting, Sustainability, Responsible Investing, ESG, Governance, Active ownership, Asset managers, Passive, Active, PRI, Mutual funds

JEL Classification: G10, G32, Q56

Suggested Citation

de Groot, Wilma and de Koning, Jan and de Koning, Jan and van Winkel, Sebastian, Sustainable Voting Behavior of Asset Managers: Do They Walk the Walk? (February 10, 2021). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3783454 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3783454

Wilma De Groot

Robeco Institutional Asset Management ( email )

Rotterdam, 3014 DA
Netherlands
+31 10 224 3107 (Phone)

Jan De Koning (Contact Author)

University of Amsterdam - Amsterdam Institute for Social Science Research (AISSR)

Amsterdam Roeterseilandcampus
Nieuwe Achtergracht 166
Amsterdam, 1018 WV
Netherlands

Robeco Institutional Asset Management

Rotterdam, 3011 AG
Netherlands

Sebastian Van Winkel

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) ( email )

P.O. Box 1738
3000 DR Rotterdam, NL 3062 PA
Netherlands

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