Information Design by an Informed Designer

37 Pages Posted: 11 Feb 2021

See all articles by Frederic Koessler

Frederic Koessler

Paris School of Economics (PSE)

Vasiliki Skreta

University of Texas at Austin - Department of Economics; University College London

Date Written: January 1, 2021

Abstract

A designer is privately informed about the state and chooses an information disclosure mechanism to influence the decisions of multiple agents playing a game. We define an intuitive class of incentive compatible information disclosure mechanisms which we coin interim optimal mechanisms. We prove that an interim optimal mechanism exists, and that it is an equilibrium outcome of the interim information design game. An ex-ante optimal mechanism may not be interim optimal, but it is whenever it is ex-post optimal. In addition, in leading settings in which action sets are binary, every ex-ante optimal mechanism is interim optimal. We relate interim optimal mechanisms to other solutions of informed principal problems.

JEL Classification: C72, D82

Suggested Citation

Koessler, Frederic and Skreta, Vasiliki, Information Design by an Informed Designer (January 1, 2021). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP15709, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3783935

Frederic Koessler (Contact Author)

Paris School of Economics (PSE) ( email )

48 Boulevard Jourdan
Paris, 75014 75014
France

Vasiliki Skreta

University of Texas at Austin - Department of Economics ( email )

Austin, TX 78712
United States

HOME PAGE: http://vskreta.wixsite.com/vskreta

University College London ( email )

Gower Street
London, WC1E 6BT
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://vskreta.wixsite.com/vskreta

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