Democracy and COVID-19 Outcomes

23 Pages Posted: 11 Feb 2021

See all articles by Mehmet Huseyin Bilgin

Mehmet Huseyin Bilgin

Istanbul Medeniyet University

Aslı Cansın Doker

Erzincan Binali Yıldırım University

Gokhan Karabulut

Istanbul University; istanbul üniversitesi

Klaus F. Zimmermann

Global Labor Organization (GLO); UNU-MERIT; Maastricht University, Department of Economics; Free University Berlin; University of Bonn; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); Journal of Population Economics

Date Written: January 2021

Abstract

More democratic countries are often expected to fail at providing a fast, strong, and effective response when facing a crisis such as COVID-19. This could result in higher infections and more negative health effects, but hard evidence to prove this claim is missing for the new disease. Studying the association with five different democracy measures, this study shows that while the infection rates of the disease do indeed appear to be higher for more democratic countries so far, their observed case fatality rates are lower. There is also a negative association between case fatality rates and government attempts to censor media. However, such censorship relates positively to the infection rate.

JEL Classification: C30, D72, I19, P16

Suggested Citation

Bilgin, Mehmet Huseyin and Doker, Aslı Cansın and Karabulut, Gokhan and Zimmermann, Klaus F., Democracy and COVID-19 Outcomes (January 2021). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP15722, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3783948

Mehmet Huseyin Bilgin (Contact Author)

Istanbul Medeniyet University ( email )

D-100 Karayolu
Merdivenkoy Mevkii No:6/1 Goztepe/Kadıkoy
Istanbul
Turkey

Aslı Cansın Doker

Erzincan Binali Yıldırım University ( email )

Erzincan
Turkey

Gokhan Karabulut

Istanbul University ( email )

Istanbul
Turkey

istanbul üniversitesi ( email )

34459 Istanbul
Turkey
05309304154 (Phone)
34684 (Fax)

Klaus F. Zimmermann

Global Labor Organization (GLO) ( email )

Bonn
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://https://glabor.org/

UNU-MERIT ( email )

Keizer Karelplein 19
Maastricht, 6211TC
Netherlands

Maastricht University, Department of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 616
Maastricht, Limburg 6200MD
Netherlands

University of Bonn

Postfach 2220
Bonn, D-53012
Germany

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Journal of Population Economics

Tiergartenstr. 17
D-69121 Heidelberg
Germany

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