Pre-Electoral Coalitions: Insights into the Boundaries of Political Parties

Aboa Centre for Economics Discussion paper No. 143

66 Pages Posted: 18 Feb 2021 Last revised: 21 Jul 2022

See all articles by Rafael Hortala-Vallve

Rafael Hortala-Vallve

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE)

Jaakko Meriläinen

ITAM, Centro de Investigación Económica

Janne Tukiainen

VATT Institute for Economic Research; University of Turku - Turku School of Business - Department of Economics

Date Written: July 19, 2022

Abstract

Finnish elections use an open-list proportional representation system, and parties may form pre-electoral coalitions (PECs) in the form of joint lists. We document that PECs are more common between parties of equal size and similar ideology, and when elections are more disproportional or involve more parties. Using difference-in-differences and density discontinuity designs, we illustrate that voters punish coalescing parties and target personal votes strategically within the coalitions, and that PECs are formed with the particular purpose of influencing the distribution of power. They increase small parties' chances of acquiring leadership positions, lead to more dispersed seat distributions, and sometimes prevent absolute majorities. We discuss the implications of these findings for the boundaries of political parties.

Keywords: bargaining power, local elections, multi-party system, open-list PR system, pre-electoral coalitions, strategic voting

Suggested Citation

Hortala-Vallve, Rafael and Meriläinen, Jaakko and Tukiainen, Janne and Tukiainen, Janne, Pre-Electoral Coalitions: Insights into the Boundaries of Political Parties (July 19, 2022). Aboa Centre for Economics Discussion paper No. 143, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3784746 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3784746

Rafael Hortala-Vallve

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE)

United Kingdom

Jaakko Meriläinen (Contact Author)

ITAM, Centro de Investigación Económica ( email )

Camino a Santa Teresa No. 930
Col. Héroes de Padierna
Ciudad de México
Mexico

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/view/jaakkomerilainen/main

Janne Tukiainen

VATT Institute for Economic Research ( email )

Arkadiankatu 7
P.O Box 1279
Helsinki, FIN-00101
Finland

University of Turku - Turku School of Business - Department of Economics ( email )

Rehtorinpellonkatu 3
Turku, 20014
Finland

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