The Political Polarization of Corporate America ✩

48 Pages Posted: 18 Feb 2021 Last revised: 21 Mar 2025

See all articles by Vyacheslav Fos

Vyacheslav Fos

Boston College - Department of Finance; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Elisabeth Kempf

Harvard University - Business School (HBS); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Margarita Tsoutsoura

Washington University in Saint Louis, John M. Olin Business School

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: March 20, 2025

Abstract

U.S. executives are increasingly segregating by political party. We establish this new fact using political affiliations from voter registration records for top executives of S&P 1500 firms between 2008 and 2022. We identify key drivers of this trend, including growing segregation among executives within geographies and industries. Executives whose political views differ from the majority of their team are more likely to depart, contributing to the increasing polarization. Furthermore, an analysis of insider trading behavior suggests that intensifying partisan disagreement among executives may further fuel this segregation. Across all of these findings, we observe a significant shift in the dynamics around the 2016 U.S. presidential election, which marks an inflection point in the political polarization of corporate leadership.

Keywords: political polarization, partisanship, executives, management teams, governance, diversity

JEL Classification: G30, G34, M12, M14

Suggested Citation

Fos, Vyacheslav and Kempf, Elisabeth and Tsoutsoura, Margarita, The Political Polarization of Corporate America ✩ (March 20, 2025). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3784969 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3784969

Vyacheslav Fos

Boston College - Department of Finance ( email )

Carroll School of Management
140 Commonwealth Avenue
Chestnut Hill, MA 02467-3808
United States

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

Elisabeth Kempf (Contact Author)

Harvard University - Business School (HBS) ( email )

Boston, MA 02163
United States

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Margarita Tsoutsoura

Washington University in Saint Louis, John M. Olin Business School ( email )

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