Defending Exclusive Representation: Tyranny of the Minority in the Workplace for Educators Poses Special Risks to Charter School Teachers

29 Pages Posted: 18 Feb 2021 Last revised: 10 Mar 2021

Date Written: July 24, 2020

Abstract

The notion of exclusive representation by bargaining agents in the public sector has been fundamentally tied to the First Amendment’s protection of free association since Abood v. Detroit Board of Education. However, some theorize Janus v. AFSCME as signaling that the Court may be interested in disconnecting associational rights in the workplace from exclusive representation. This paper explores several recent rulings, namely Knox v. SEIU, Harris v. Quinn, Janus, and how those rulings are focused into the discussion surrounding exclusive representation for workers’ associational rights within charter schools. Next it analyzes the ongoing academic debate after 2012 regarding collective bargaining agreements within charter schools by utilizing recent legal journals. Last, this paper argues that dismantling exclusive representation within the context of associational rights in the public sector would create a major barrier to equitable parity for educators within charter schools as compared to their public-school counterparts. Or, put more simply, a heckler’s veto within a bargaining unit should not carry more weight after certification of an exclusive representative.

Keywords: Exclusive Representation, Labor, Employment, Unions, Free Association, First Amendment, Agency Fees, Bargaining Unit, Tyranny of the Minority, Compelled Speech, State Interests, Collective Bargaining, Rights at Work, Charter Schools, Economics, Monopsony, Education, Public Policy, Captive Markets

JEL Classification: J42, J47, J83, K23, K31, L12

Suggested Citation

Wazlavek, Thomas D. Aaron, Defending Exclusive Representation: Tyranny of the Minority in the Workplace for Educators Poses Special Risks to Charter School Teachers (July 24, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3786361 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3786361

Thomas D. Aaron Wazlavek (Contact Author)

University of Massachusetts School of Law ( email )

333 Faunce Corner Road
North Dartmouth, MA 02747
United States

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