Tradeoffs in Permissioned vs Permissionless Blockchains: Trust and Performance

29 Pages Posted: 22 Mar 2021 Last revised: 3 Dec 2021

See all articles by Yannis Bakos

Yannis Bakos

New York University (NYU) - Department of Information, Operations, and Management Sciences

Hanna Halaburda

New York University (NYU) - Leonard N. Stern School of Business

Date Written: February 1, 2021

Abstract

It is generally agreed that permissioned blockchains can improve on the operational cost and performance of permissionless blockchains, but it is usually assumed that this improvement comes at the cost of transaction security, especially in low-trust environments. We develop a model of transaction safety in permissioned and permissionless blockchains to study this tradeoff and find that in several settings there may be no tradeoff at all. With a minimal level of trust in the blockchain operators and the supporting institutions, well-designed permissioned blockchains can offer both higher operational efficiency and higher transaction security. While this minimal trust in the ``system'' is essential to the functioning of permissioned blockchains, it is also inherent in most business relationships, making permissioned blockchains well suited for enterprise applications of the technology. We explore the implications of our analysis for the design of permissioned blockchains, such as the reputation or bonding implications for their validators.

Keywords: permissioned blockchains, permissionless blockchains, transaction safety in blockchains, comparison of blockchains

JEL Classification: D85, D89

Suggested Citation

Bakos, Yannis and Halaburda, Hanna, Tradeoffs in Permissioned vs Permissionless Blockchains: Trust and Performance (February 1, 2021). NYU Stern School of Business working paper, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3789425 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3789425

Yannis Bakos (Contact Author)

New York University (NYU) - Department of Information, Operations, and Management Sciences ( email )

44 West Fourth Street
New York, NY 10012
United States
212-998-0841 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.stern.nyu.edu/~bakos

Hanna Halaburda

New York University (NYU) - Leonard N. Stern School of Business ( email )

44 West 4th Street
New York, NY NY 10012
United States

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