Owner Incentives and Performance in Healthcare: Private Equity Investment in Nursing Homes

82 Pages Posted: 22 Feb 2021 Last revised: 20 Oct 2024

See all articles by Atul Gupta

Atul Gupta

University of Pennsylvania - Health Care Management

Sabrina T. Howell

New York University (NYU) - New York University

Constantine Yannelis

University of Chicago

Abhinav Gupta

University of North Carolina (UNC) at Chapel Hill - Finance Area

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: February 2021

Abstract

Amid an aging population and a growing role for private equity (PE) in elder care, this paper studies how PE ownership affects U.S. nursing homes using patient-level Medicare data. We show that PE ownership leads to lower-risk patients and increases mortality. After instrumenting for the patient-nursing home match, we recover a local average treatment effect on mortality of 11%. Declines in measures of patient well-being, nurse staffing, and compliance with care standards help to explain the mortality effect. Overall, we conclude that PE has nuanced effects, with adverse outcomes for a subset of patients.

Suggested Citation

Gupta, Atul and T. Howell, Sabrina and Yannelis, Constantine and Gupta, Abhinav, Owner Incentives and Performance in Healthcare: Private Equity Investment in Nursing Homes (February 2021). NBER Working Paper No. w28474, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3790212

Atul Gupta (Contact Author)

University of Pennsylvania - Health Care Management ( email )

204 Colonial Penn Center
3641 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, 19104-6218
United States

Sabrina T. Howell

New York University (NYU) - New York University

Constantine Yannelis

University of Chicago ( email )

1101 East 58th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
United States

Abhinav Gupta

University of North Carolina (UNC) at Chapel Hill - Finance Area ( email )

Kenan-Flagler Business School
Chapel Hill, NC 27599-3490
United States

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
194
Abstract Views
1,262
Rank
6,579
PlumX Metrics