Settlement Around the World: Settlement Rates in the Largest Economies

108 Pages Posted: 26 Feb 2021 Last revised: 18 Mar 2021

See all articles by Yun-chien Chang

Yun-chien Chang

Academia Sinica - Institutum Iurisprudentiae (IIAS)

Daniel M. Klerman

University of Southern California Gould School of Law

Date Written: February 25, 2021

Abstract

This article presents the results of the first rigorous attempt to collect settlement rate data from a substantial number of countries. Data on settlement were collected for twenty-three of the twenty-five largest economies. Settlement rates vary greatly, from below 15% in France, Belgium, and Russia, to over two-thirds in Australia. Settlement rates also vary dramatically by legal origin, with French civil law countries generally having the lowest settlement rates, and common law countries generally the highest. In addition, as predicted by simple economic theory, settlement rates are correlated positively with litigation costs and early disclosure requirements, but only weakly with fee shifting rules. Settlement rates are generally highest for tort cases. The analysis in this paper suggests that selection effects may not be a significant problem for empirical work involving civil law countries.

Keywords: settlement, dispute resolution, legal origin, fee shifting, delay, comparative law, selection, culture

Suggested Citation

Chang, Yun-chien and Klerman, Daniel M., Settlement Around the World: Settlement Rates in the Largest Economies (February 25, 2021). USC CLASS Research Paper No. CLASS21-8, USC Law Legal Studies Paper No. 21-8, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3793078 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3793078

Yun-chien Chang

Academia Sinica - Institutum Iurisprudentiae (IIAS) ( email )

128 Academia Sinica Rd., Sec. 2
Nankang
Taipei City, 11529
Taiwan

Daniel M. Klerman (Contact Author)

University of Southern California Gould School of Law ( email )

699 Exposition Boulevard
Los Angeles, CA 90089
United States
213-740-7973 (Phone)
213-740-5502 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://weblaw.usc.edu/contact/contactInfo.cfm?detailID=227

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