Structural Biases in Structural Constitutional Law

58 Pages Posted: 4 Mar 2021 Last revised: 6 Apr 2021

See all articles by Jonathan Gould

Jonathan Gould

University of California, Berkeley - School of Law

David Pozen

Columbia University - Law School

Date Written: March 3, 2021

Abstract

Structural constitutional law regulates the workings of government and supplies the rules of the political game. Whether by design or by accident, these rules sometimes tilt the playing field for or against certain political factions—not just episodically, based on who holds power at a given moment, but systematically over time—in terms of electoral outcomes or policy objectives. In these instances, structural constitutional law is itself structurally biased.

This Article identifies and begins to develop the concept of such structural biases, with a focus on biases affecting the major political parties. Recent years have witnessed a revival of political conflict over the basic terms of the U.S. constitutional order. We suggest that this phenomenon, and a large part of structural constitutional conflict in general, is best explained by the interaction between partisan polarization and structural bias, each of which can intensify the other. The Article also offers a typology of structural biases, keyed to the contemporary United States but potentially applicable to any system. To date, legal scholars have lagged social scientists in investigating the efficiency, distributional, and political effects of governance arrangements. The concept of structural bias, we aim to show, can help bridge this disciplinary gap and thereby advance the study of constitutional design and constitutional politics.

Keywords: constitutional law; constitutional theory; institutional design; regulation; law and politics; law and political economy; Congress, courts, and agencies; polarization; parties

Suggested Citation

Gould, Jonathan and Pozen, David E., Structural Biases in Structural Constitutional Law (March 3, 2021). New York University Law Review, Forthcoming, Columbia Public Law Research Paper No. 14-690, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3797051

Jonathan Gould

University of California, Berkeley - School of Law ( email )

215 Boalt Hall
Berkeley, CA 94720-7200
United States

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.law.berkeley.edu/our-faculty/faculty-profiles/jonathan-gould/

David E. Pozen (Contact Author)

Columbia University - Law School ( email )

435 West 116th Street
New York, NY 10025
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.law.columbia.edu/faculty/david-pozen

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
1,675
Abstract Views
4,822
rank
12,263
PlumX Metrics