Macromedical Regulation

82 Ohio State Law Journal (2021)

Duke Law School Public Law & Legal Theory Series No. 2021-20

51 Pages Posted: 22 Mar 2021 Last revised: 21 Feb 2023

See all articles by Barak D. Richman

Barak D. Richman

Duke University School of Law; CERC, Stanford Univ. School of Medicine; George Washington University - Law School

Steven L. Schwarcz

Duke University School of Law

Date Written: June 10, 2021

Abstract

The COVID-19 pandemic has dramatically shown that a localized disease can be transmitted to the broader population, nationally and worldwide. This Article analyzes how to design regulation to help control that transmission. To that end, we first observe that existing healthcare regulation focuses almost exclusively on regulating individual components of the medical and healthcare industry, while lacking a capacity to address how those components work together as a system—a system that pandemics can destabilize. Indeed, one factor that contributed to COVID-19’s spread was the inability of U.S. healthcare regulation to operate on a societal level, to protect certain components from the deficiencies of others. We contend that healthcare regulation must also include what we call “macromedical” regulation: regulation that focuses on protecting the stability of the healthcare sector as a system of interconnected parts. We find some useful analogies in the Dodd-Frank Act and other post-crisis financial regulation, particularly in macroprudential regulation designed to protect the financial system as a system.

Suggested Citation

Richman, Barak D. and Schwarcz, Steven L., Macromedical Regulation (June 10, 2021). 82 Ohio State Law Journal (2021), Duke Law School Public Law & Legal Theory Series No. 2021-20, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3798810

Barak D. Richman (Contact Author)

Duke University School of Law ( email )

210 Science Drive
Box 90362
Durham, NC 27708
United States
919-613-7244 (Phone)
919-613-7231 (Fax)

CERC, Stanford Univ. School of Medicine ( email )

United States

George Washington University - Law School ( email )

2000 H Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20052
United States

Steven L. Schwarcz

Duke University School of Law ( email )

210 Science Drive
Box 90362
Durham, NC 27708
United States
919-613-7060 (Phone)
919-613-7231 (Fax)

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