Download This PaperEvidence Production in Merger Control: The Role of Remedies
17 Pages Posted: 8 Mar 2021
Date Written: 2021
Abstract
We analyze evidence production in merger control as a delegation problem in an inquisitorial competition policy system. The antitrust agency’s incentives to produce evidence on the efficiency of a merger proposal depend critically on its action set. Allowing for a compromising remedy solution reduces information acquisition incentives, and could therefore reduce consumer welfare. The effort-frustrating effect of the remedy solution can be eliminated if a remedy solution can be implemented only after evidence on the efficiency of a merger proposal has been produced.
JEL Classification: L130, L400, K210
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Dertwinkel-Kalt, Markus and Wey, Christian, Evidence Production in Merger Control: The Role of Remedies (2021). CESifo Working Paper No. 8915, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3798936
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