Evidence Production in Merger Control: The Role of Remedies

17 Pages Posted: 8 Mar 2021

See all articles by Markus Dertwinkel-Kalt

Markus Dertwinkel-Kalt

Frankfurt School of Finance & Management

Christian Wey

University of Düsseldorf - Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)

Date Written: 2021

Abstract

We analyze evidence production in merger control as a delegation problem in an inquisitorial competition policy system. The antitrust agency’s incentives to produce evidence on the efficiency of a merger proposal depend critically on its action set. Allowing for a compromising remedy solution reduces information acquisition incentives, and could therefore reduce consumer welfare. The effort-frustrating effect of the remedy solution can be eliminated if a remedy solution can be implemented only after evidence on the efficiency of a merger proposal has been produced.

JEL Classification: L130, L400, K210

Suggested Citation

Dertwinkel-Kalt, Markus and Wey, Christian, Evidence Production in Merger Control: The Role of Remedies (2021). CESifo Working Paper No. 8915, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3798936

Markus Dertwinkel-Kalt (Contact Author)

Frankfurt School of Finance & Management ( email )

Adickesallee 32-34
Frankfurt, 60322
Germany

Christian Wey

University of Düsseldorf - Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE) ( email )

Universitaetsstr. 1
Duesseldorf, NRW 40225
Germany
+49-211-81-15009 (Phone)
+49-211-81-15499 (Fax)

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
12
Abstract Views
54
PlumX Metrics