Constitutional Courts and International Investment Law in Latin America: Between Escalation and Conditional Coexistence

Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law & International Law (MPIL) Research Paper No. 2021-07

forthcoming in ‘Stephan W Schill, Christian J Tams and Rainer Hofmann (eds), International Investment Law and Constitutional Law’ (Elgar 2021).

36 Pages Posted: 8 Mar 2021 Last revised: 10 Mar 2021

Date Written: March 8, 2021

Abstract

Constitutional courts are important actors in the development of international investment law). I argue here that constitutional courts can exert more influence and protect human rights and national constitutional values more efficiently if they operate within a method of conditional coexistence. This path implies that constitutional courts manage normative conflicts between investment agreements (IIAs) and a national constitution by defining a set of minimum conditions that IIAs must satisfy before they enter into force. The very exercise of setting conditions for IIAs can allow a constitutional court to monitor the application and interpretation of that IIA, providing themselves with leeway to react to a range of possible dynamics in respect of the future development of an investment treaty.

Keywords: Pluralism, legitimacy, international investment law, Constitutional Courts

Suggested Citation

Prieto Muñoz, Jose Gustavo, Constitutional Courts and International Investment Law in Latin America: Between Escalation and Conditional Coexistence (March 8, 2021). Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law & International Law (MPIL) Research Paper No. 2021-07, forthcoming in ‘Stephan W Schill, Christian J Tams and Rainer Hofmann (eds), International Investment Law and Constitutional Law’ (Elgar 2021)., Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3800038 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3800038

Jose Gustavo Prieto Muñoz (Contact Author)

Ghent University ( email )

Coupure Links 653
Gent, 9000
Belgium

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