Peer Pressure in Reporting Discretion: Evidence From Bank Holding Company Subsidiaries

43 Pages Posted: 30 Mar 2021 Last revised: 31 Mar 2021

See all articles by John Aland

John Aland

Fairfield University; University of Michigan, Stephen M. Ross School of Business

Date Written: January 14, 2021

Abstract

Subsidiaries of a firm can use their reporting discretion for several goals, such as reporting earnings comparable to other subsidiaries or reporting earnings that are smooth over time. Prior theoretical work on reporting discretion recognizes the tension among these goals (Holmstrom, 1982; Demski and Sappington, 1974), but empirical work has not sufficiently examined it. This study exploits the bank holding company setting to investigate how subsidiaries use reporting discretion to navigate these competing objectives. I find that while subsidiaries use reporting discretion to smooth their own earnings, they also use reporting discretion to herd around the earnings of internal peers. Through a number of cross-sectional analyses, I find that this herding behavior appears consistent with relative performance evaluation motivations. These results provide new insight into prior mixed findings on the reporting choices of bank holding companies.

Keywords: bank, relative performance evaluation, loan loss provision, subsidiary

JEL Classification: G21, M41

Suggested Citation

Aland, John, Peer Pressure in Reporting Discretion: Evidence From Bank Holding Company Subsidiaries (January 14, 2021). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3800363 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3800363

John Aland (Contact Author)

Fairfield University ( email )

N. Benson Road
Fairfield, CT 06824
United States

University of Michigan, Stephen M. Ross School of Business ( email )

701 Tappan Street
Ann Arbor, MI MI 48109
United States

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