Capital Requirements, Market Power and Risk-Taking in Banking
36 Pages Posted: 14 Feb 2003
Date Written: January 2003
This Paper presents a dynamic model of imperfect competition in banking where banks can invest in a prudent or a gambling asset. We show that if intermediation margins are small, the banks' franchise values will be small, and in the absence of regulation only a gambling equilibrium will exist. In this case, either flat-rate capital requirements or binding deposit rate ceilings can ensure the existence of a prudent equilibrium, although both have a negative impact on deposit rates. Such impact does not obtain with either risk-based capital requirements or non-binding deposit rate ceilings, but only the former are always effective in controlling risk-shifting incentives.
Keywords: Bank regulation, capital requirements, deposit rate ceilings, moral hazard, risk-shifting, imperfect competition, franchise values
JEL Classification: D43, G21, G28
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation