Managing Service Shutdowns: Cash Refunds or Vouchers?

57 Pages Posted: 18 Mar 2021 Last revised: 21 Nov 2022

See all articles by Rachel R. Chen

Rachel R. Chen

University of California, Davis - Graduate School of Management

Eitan Gerstner

Technion-Israel Institute of Technology - The William Davidson Faculty of Industrial Engineering & Management

Daniel Halbheer

HEC Paris - Marketing

Paolo Roma

University of Palermo

Date Written: October 4, 2022

Abstract

Service shutdowns -- extended disruptions of operations -- caused by exogenous events are on the rise. Such shutdowns pose major challenges for service providers, customers, and regulators. Providers prefer vouchers as a means of service recovery to limit bankruptcy risk, whereas customers demand cash refunds or vouchers that include a generous bonus. Regulators, on the other hand, insist that customers must be granted the right to be reimbursed in cash. This paper shows that a zero bonus is optimal under the voucher-only strategy, whereas the provider should always include a positive bonus with the voucher under the hybrid strategy that allows customers to choose between the cash refund and voucher options. Surprisingly, despite its higher flexibility in service recovery design, the hybrid strategy can be dominated by the voucher-only strategy in terms of profit and welfare. Moreover, we show that the ranking of strategies differs across the two important dimensions of expected profit and survival under shutdown. Finally, we study competition among providers and show that a high-quality provider is more likely to use cash-back as the service recovery strategy than its low-quality competitor.

Keywords: Service Failure and Recovery, Service Shutdown, Cash Refund, Voucher, Service Replacement.

Suggested Citation

Chen, Rachel R. and Gerstner, Eitan and Halbheer, Daniel and Roma, Paolo, Managing Service Shutdowns: Cash Refunds or Vouchers? (October 4, 2022). HEC Paris Research Paper No. MKG-2021-1416, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3801132 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3801132

Rachel R. Chen

University of California, Davis - Graduate School of Management ( email )

One Shields Avenue
Davis, CA 95616
United States
530-752-7619 (Phone)
530-752-2924 (Fax)

Eitan Gerstner

Technion-Israel Institute of Technology - The William Davidson Faculty of Industrial Engineering & Management ( email )

Haifa 32000
Israel

Daniel Halbheer (Contact Author)

HEC Paris - Marketing ( email )

Paris
France

Paolo Roma

University of Palermo ( email )

Viale delle Scienza
Palermo, Palermo 90128
Italy

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