The Essential Facilities Doctrine in the Digital Economy: Dispelling Persistent Myths

59 Pages Posted: 15 Mar 2021 Last revised: 17 Nov 2021

See all articles by Nikolas Guggenberger

Nikolas Guggenberger

University of Houston Law Center; Yale University - Yale Information Society Project

Date Written: March 11, 2021

Abstract

The antitrust “essential facilities” doctrine is reawakening. After decades of rejection and decline, the doctrine’s approach of granting access rights to facilities for which there is no reasonable alternative in the market has received several high-profile endorsements across the political spectrum. While courts have mainly applied the doctrine to physical infrastructure, its potential now lies in addressing the gatekeeping power of online platforms. However, despite its recent endorsements, the doctrine’s criticisms linger. Many of the objections to the essential facilities doctrine are fueled by persistent myths and misconceptions, most prominently related to its economic justification, administrability, and propensity to entrench monopoly power. This Article lays out the case for the essential facilities doctrine in the digital economy and addresses the most common counterarguments that limit the doctrine’s potential to open digital markets.

Keywords: Antitrust, Platforms, Competition Policy, Tech, Essential Facilities Doctrine, Innovation

Suggested Citation

Guggenberger, Nikolas, The Essential Facilities Doctrine in the Digital Economy: Dispelling Persistent Myths (March 11, 2021). 23 Yale J.L. & Tech. 301 (2021), Yale Law & Economics Research Paper Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3802559 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3802559

Nikolas Guggenberger (Contact Author)

University of Houston Law Center ( email )

4170 Martin Luther King Blvd
Houston, TX 77204-6060
United States

Yale University - Yale Information Society Project ( email )

127 Wall Street
New Haven, CT 06511
United States

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