Bribes, Lobbying and Industrial Structure

29 Pages Posted: 19 Mar 2021

See all articles by Roy Cerqueti

Roy Cerqueti

University Sapienza Rome

Raffaella Coppier

Università degli Studi di Macerata - Department of Economics and Law

Gustavo Piga

University of Rome

Date Written: March 11, 2021

Abstract

This paper deals with the relationship between regulatory compliance, bureaucratic corruption, lobbying and the industrial structure of a country. We show that lobbying and bureaucratic corruption can coexist at the macro level when we allow for heterogeneity in firm size. Countries with similar level of development are often characterized by very different industrial structures: we show the implications this has for the level of compliance, corruption and lobbying in that country. Welfare implications of our model point toward encouraging policies that support the small business sector of an economy and toward flexible regulatory policies meant to suppress regulation for small enough firms.

Keywords: Bureaucratic Corruption, Lobbying, Industrial Organization.

JEL Classification: H26, L51, K42

Suggested Citation

Cerqueti, Roy and Coppier, Raffaella and Piga, Gustavo, Bribes, Lobbying and Industrial Structure (March 11, 2021). CEIS Working Paper No. 511, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3802892 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3802892

Roy Cerqueti

University Sapienza Rome ( email )

Piazzale Aldo Moro 5
Roma, Rome 00185
Italy

Raffaella Coppier

Università degli Studi di Macerata - Department of Economics and Law ( email )

via Crescimbeni 20
Macerata, 62100
Italy

Gustavo Piga (Contact Author)

University of Rome ( email )

Via di Tor Vergata
Rome, Lazio
Italy

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