Partial Passive Ownership Holdings, Licensing and Taxation

13 Pages Posted: 19 Mar 2021

See all articles by Stefanos Leonardos

Stefanos Leonardos

Singapore University of Technology and Design

Emmanuel Petrakis

University of Crete - Department of Economics

Panagiotis Skartados

University of Crete - Department of Economics

Giorgos Stamatopoulos

University of Crete - Department of Economics

Date Written: March 18, 2021

Abstract

We consider a homogenous good Cournot duopoly, in which a firm owns a
cost-reducing technology and has a non-controlling share over its rival. We
show that partial passive ownership holdings may induce licensing via a
fixed fee and increase consumer surplus, tax revenues, and social welfare.
Moreover, a decrease in the ad valorem tax may also facilitate licensing and
increase welfare.

Keywords: partial passive ownership, licensing, ad valorem tax, fixed fee,

JEL Classification: L10, L24, L41,

Suggested Citation

Leonardos, Stefanos and Petrakis, Emmanuel and Skartados, Panagiotis and Stamatopoulos, Giorgos, Partial Passive Ownership Holdings, Licensing and Taxation (March 18, 2021). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3807133 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3807133

Stefanos Leonardos

Singapore University of Technology and Design ( email )

8 Somapah Road
487372
Singapore

HOME PAGE: http://stefanosleonardos.com/

Emmanuel Petrakis (Contact Author)

University of Crete - Department of Economics ( email )

GR-74100 Rethymnon, GR-74100
Greece
+30 28310 77409 (Phone)
+30 28310 77406 (Fax)

Panagiotis Skartados

University of Crete - Department of Economics ( email )

RETHIMNO
Greece

Giorgos Stamatopoulos

University of Crete - Department of Economics ( email )

GR-74100 Rethymnon, GR-74100
Greece

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
19
Abstract Views
146
PlumX Metrics