Expected Distribution of Seats vs. Coalition Bargaining: What Matters More for Strategic Voting in Proportional Systems

43 Pages Posted: 26 Mar 2021

See all articles by Guillem Riambau

Guillem Riambau

Universitat de Barcelona; University of Barcelona - Barcelona Institute of Economics (IEB)

Date Written: September 1, 2020

Abstract

This paper studies voting behavior in proportional representation systems. It proposes a model in which coalition formation cannot be accurately predicted once the distribution of seats in parliament is known. Voters care about policy outcomes, and are all assumed to be strategic. Identical agents who expect extremely similar electoral outcomes but expect different coalitions have radically opposed strategies. The model is tested against empirical data from Israel, 2006. Results suggest that agents with similar preferences who have reasonably similar expectations regarding the distribution of votes may use different voting strategies precisely when expect different coalitions. The implications of this are discussed.

Keywords: coalitions, subjective expectations, voting behavior, electoral systems

JEL Classification: C25, C51, D72, D84

Suggested Citation

Riambau, Guillem, Expected Distribution of Seats vs. Coalition Bargaining: What Matters More for Strategic Voting in Proportional Systems (September 1, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3808079 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3808079

Guillem Riambau (Contact Author)

Universitat de Barcelona ( email )

Gran Via de les Corts Catalanes, 585
Barcelona, 08007
Spain

University of Barcelona - Barcelona Institute of Economics (IEB) ( email )

c/ John M. Keynes, 1-11
Barcelona, 08034
Spain

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